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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court announced its decision in National Fed-
eration of Independent Business v. Sebelius,1 reaction to the long-awaited 
decision was initially mixed and confused.  In an effort to report the 
news as quickly as possible in the saturated cable and internet news 
market, CNN and Fox News Channel reported within minutes of the 
beginning of the reading of the opinion that the Court had found 
the Individual Mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act unconstitutional.2  Both networks eventually retracted that 
announcement to report that the Court had found the law constitu-
tional.3  The initial confusion was caused by the surprising basis on 
which Chief Justice John Roberts found the portion of the law requir-
ing minimal health insurance coverage, known as the Individual 
Mandate, as an unconstitutional use of Congress’s Commerce Clause4 
authority, yet constitutional under Congress’s taxing authority.5  Re-
porters reading the opinion came across the negative ruling first and 
apparently, those for CNN and Fox reported that without reviewing 
the remainder of the opinion. 
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would like to thank my colleague Thomas Kleven for comments on an earlier draft of this 
article.  I would also like to thank my research assistants, Shanisha Smith, Juan Jose 
Becerra, and Lola Oyekan, who provided invaluable assistance for this article.   
 1 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 2 Rush to report US health ruling trips up CNN, Fox, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2012, 7:26 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/AP7fb98cdd01154a4d844b1bfc5d3270cd.html. 
 3 Id. 
 4 The Clause states that the United States Congress shall have power “To regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 5 The issue of the commercial power is from an appeal from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
under the citation of Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 
(11th Cir. 2011).  That court, holding that the Mandate was unconstitutional, addressed 
the question of the existence or non-existence of a principle, which would limit the asser-
tion of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 1295–98. 
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Though supporters of the law applauded the ruling, few reflected 
on the effect that the decision on the Commerce Clause would have 
on the commercial power of Congress.  Chief Justice Roberts, in a 
portion of his opinion not joined by any other Justice, found the use 
unconstitutional because of the absence of a limiting principle that 
would police congressional authority.6  By the Chief’s reasoning, to 
engage in commerce, one has to engage in an activity.  The condition 
of not being insured is to not engage in commerce, in this case de-
fined as the buying of insurance.  Hence, this characterization of a 
particular state of being became the basis of announcing a new limit-
ing principle on Congress’s commercial authority.  And though the 
value of the Commerce Clause to Congress as it exercises its legisla-
tive authority in commercial matters may not have been destroyed, it 
has been weakened in a decision that allows the Court to scrutinize 
and perhaps even micro-analyze the bases for congressional authority 
in commercial cases, and perhaps even in other areas as well.  It sets a 
precedent that suggests that the Court can restrict congressional au-
thority based upon the Court’s notion of the appropriate power dy-
namics between state and federal governments further rooted in the 
Court’s understanding of the structural requirements of the Constitu-
tion. 
That portion of the opinion, though it did not destroy the Man-
date, is another in a series of cases reversing a consensus held among 
members of the Supreme Court for two generations on the breadth 
of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.  The tension in 
Commerce Clause cases centers around the relationship between the 
broad power of the Commerce Clause within a capitalist system and 
the need to restrain that authority from overwhelming the nation’s 
federal system and possibly creating a federal police power of general 
regulation—a power long regarded as forbidden, violative of the 
Tenth Amendment, and beyond the scope of the Constitution’s sys-
 
 6 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, in a joint dissent, declined to join the opin-
ion of the Chief Justice.  The joint dissenters also declined to join the Chief Justice in the 
conclusion that the Mandate was constitutional as a tax.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).  
Other issues decided by the Court include the constitutionality of the portion of the law 
requiring state funding of Medicaid expansion as a condition for receiving continued 
Medicaid funding (found unconstitutional); the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act 
prohibiting injunction suits prior to taxation by the federal government (found inappli-
cable to the present case).  On the Individual Mandate portion of the decision, Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the Chief Justice in characterizing the 
Mandate as a constitutional exercise of the Congress’s taxing power, yet dissented on that 
portion of the opinion finding that Congress had exceeded its authority under the 
Commerce Clause. 
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tem of enumerated powers granted to Congress.7  For sixty years, a 
period beginning with the “Second New Deal”8 to the mid 1990s, the 
Court regularly deferred to Congress upon its judicially confirmed 
assurance that its legislation was a rational use of the commercial 
power, a practice that placed the inevitable subjectivity involved in 
line-drawing with the political body, perhaps the better home for 
such decisions.9 
The Chief Justice’s opinion notwithstanding, the Constitution 
provided Congress with the power to do what was necessary and 
proper to implement its specific enumerated powers.  The Necessary 
and Proper Clause,10 a practical addendum to the enumerated pow-
ers, likely would have had to have been read into the Constitution if it 
had not been part of the text because of the practical impossibility of 
utilizing the enumerated powers without legislative freedom to pre-
scribe the means of the implementation.11 
In addition to the Commerce Clause’s authorization to Congress 
to “regulate commerce among the several states,” the Necessary and 
Proper Clause has been interpreted as allowing Congress to regulate 
those activities that substantially affect Commerce among the several 
states.12  This authority took on enlarged proportions in the second 
half of the New Deal of the 1930s, allowing Congress to regulate be-
yond purely interstate commercial activities.13 
The changes in constitutional jurisprudence brought about by the 
Great Depression came about during a period of reassessment of tra-
ditional constitutional theory, particularly in Commerce Clause juris-
 
 7 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 8 The term refers to the second presidential term of Franklin D. Roosevelt during which 
changes in Supreme Court opinions and personnel allowed new legislation enacted by 
Congress, much of it under the Commerce Clause, to be implemented to counter the ef-
fects of the Great Depression.  See infra Part III.C. 
 9 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 11 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (“The subject is the execution of those 
great powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends.  It must have been the 
intention of those who gave these powers . . . to insure . . . their beneficial execu-
tion . . . by confiding the choice of means . . . to adopt any which might be appropriate, 
and which were conducive to the end.”). 
 12 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (2005) (“Congress’s 
regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate 
commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) de-
rives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”). 
 13 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (affirming that intrastate 
activities may be regulated by Congress if they have a close and substantial relation to in-
terstate commerce); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that 
Congress can regulate local activities that exert a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce). 
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prudence.  This reassessment was spawned by the extreme need to 
confront unprecedented problems in the national economy.  The cri-
sis precipitated two direct confrontations between the political 
branches and the Judiciary, the first being on the issue of what kind 
of legislation was appropriate for the economic crisis.  The second 
confrontation was even more direct, to the point of constitutional cri-
sis—Franklin D. Roosevelt’s failed Court Packing Plan, which he pro-
posed out of frustration with the Court’s rulings that gutted that legis-
lation during his first term. 
In the period running from 1933 to 1936, the Supreme Court was 
at the end of a several-decade run of economically conservative deci-
sions reflecting a laissez-faire economic philosophy.14  During the 
1933–36 period, the Court declined to recognize congressional power 
in several economic cases that lay at the heart of the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration’s economic recovery agenda. 
Among the decisions that frustrated Roosevelt’s first term were 
decisions rejecting key New Deal initiatives such as the National Re-
covery Act,15 the Railroad Retirement Act,16 and the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act of 1935,17 each of which was based on the Con-
gress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, whose meaning was 
expanded significantly following the realignment of the Supreme 
Court during Roosevelt’s second term.  The decisions of the first 
term, however, were based on reasoning that had been around for 
several decades before.  Under the former interpretation, the Court’s 
limiting principle was based on the “identity” of the items actually 
moving between the several states.18  In addition, those activities 
which facilitated the movement, or were part of the process of mov-
ing or within the stream of the commerce, were also subject to con-
 
 14 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:  A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN 
AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 39–74 (1941) (describing the evolution of judicial supremacy 
from 1865 to 1932). 
 15 See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding the 
delegation of legislative power sought to be made to the president in the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act to be unconstitutional). 
 16 See R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (striking down the Railroad Re-
tirement Act as violative of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses). 
 17 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act of 1935 was unconstitutionally outside of the scope of Congress’s enu-
merated powers). 
 18 For example, in United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Court ruled that ap-
plication of the Sherman Anti-trust Act to a sugar manufacturing trust in Pennsylvania 
was unconstitutional.  Under that Court’s reasoning, because manufacturing was a purely 
intrastate activity, its affect on “interstate commerce” was at best indirect and out of the 
reach of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.  See infra Part III.B. 
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gressional regulation.19  The new-New Deal Commerce Clause inter-
pretation essentially expanded the close and substantial relation test 
used in some of the earlier cases by broadly allowing regulation of all 
activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.20  This new 
meaning changed federalism principles of Commerce Clause litiga-
tion for the next several decades and represented a foundational 
change in constitutional theory and the relationship between the 
Court and political branches of government.  Judicial deference to 
rational regulation by Congress became the rule of the day and for 
decades after. 
The New Deal was a break in the prevailing approach to constitu-
tional interpretation in the sense that the legal designers of the eco-
nomic reforms believed in a constitution flexible enough to address 
contemporary problems.21  The New Deal constituted a rare open and 
unabashed acknowledgment that the specific needs of society, the 
crisis of the moment, dictated the appropriate constitutional theory.  
Legislation under the New Deal was a bold intrusion by the federal 
government into the economic life of the nation—apparently hereto-
fore regarded as a matter of purely private concern.22  To accomplish 
 
 19 Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (regulation of rail-
road freight rates ruled as having a close and substantial relation to commerce); Swift & 
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (holding that the monopoly of sales in interstate 
commerce as within Congress’s authority to regulate under the “stream of commerce” 
theory). 
 20 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937) (holding that Congress 
has regulatory authority to regulate various operations of an interstate company, includ-
ing labor relations in manufacturing having a substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
 21 Consider Robert Jackson’s description of the tension between the Court and the political 
branches: 
   But liberal-minded lawyers also recognized that constitutional law is not a fixed body 
of immutable doctrine.  We knew its rules had their beginnings and endings, their exten-
sions and their recessions many times in the checkered history of the Court.  We saw that 
those changes were identified with the predominant interests or currents of opinion of 
past epochs, though they were often made in the name of the Constitution itself.  The 
peculiar character of judicial tenure had enabled a past that was dead and repudiated in 
the intellectual and political world to keep firm grip on the judicial world.  What we de-
manded for our generation was the right consciously to influence the evolutionary pro-
cess of constitutional law, as other generations had done.   
  JACKSON, supra note 14, at xiv. 
 22 As noted by a contemporary observer: 
  The technique of the New Deal had been based almost entirely upon the exercise of un-
tried national power to cope with extraordinary economic conditions.  As soon as test 
cases reached the Supreme Court the broad regulatory powers assumed by the ‘admin-
istration were sharply deflated.  Both agriculture and local business were removed from 
the domain of federal agencies attempting to regulate output, prices, etc.  Even the spe-
cial problem industries were held to lie beyond the reach of national planning.  And the 
power of the States to deal with economic problems appeared to be very narrowly limited. 
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this, the reformers in the Roosevelt Administration argued for a re-
articulation of constitutional economic theory on the basis that with-
out it the nation will fail.23  In so doing, the reformers challenged the 
notion that the Constitution is a static document with a single mean-
ing with judges as the truth-seekers.  In fact, it challenged constitu-
tionalism to embrace a broader vision of the document, one respon-
sive to the policy imperatives of the democratically elected Congress.24 
The new understanding of the Clause and the implementing au-
thority provided by the substantial effects doctrine effectively dis-
missed dual federalism—the view that state and federal power re-
gimes are completely separate and distinct25—allowing Congress to 
regulate intrastate activities as appropriate to the circumstances.  The 
limiting principle was Congress’s own rationality assessment of its leg-
islation.26  The new application of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
allowed the expansion of federal power into areas previously thought 
reserved for the states.  The result was that the understanding of fed-
eralism of the older cases was dealt with perhaps dismissively as in Jus-
tice Stone’s relegation of the Tenth Amendment to the status of a 
truism in United States v. Darby,27 and in Justice Blackmun’s demotion 
of the provision to the political sphere in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority.28 
The present regulatory environment is faced with Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence where congressional power under the Clause is 
defined by artificial notions of federalist limits.  United States v. Lopez29 
 
  MERLO J. PUSEY, THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS 3 (1937). 
 23 JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, PACKING THE COURT:  THE RISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND THE 
COMING CRISIS OF THE SUPREME COURT 139–41 (2009) (contrasting with Roosevelt’s vi-
sion, the conservative Justices “scoffed at the notion that the economic crisis justi-
fied . . . a new understanding of the Constitution”). 
 24 One of the new post-Court-Packing Plan justices, Felix Frankfurter, is regarded as an op-
ponent of judicial activism.  Though well regarded in civil rights circles as an academic at 
Harvard Law School prior to joining the court, responding to the “activism” of the Loch-
ner era, his deference to the legislative process often cast him later in his career as con-
servative.  Book Note, Six Justices on Civil Rights, 97 HARV. L. REV. 618, 618–21 (1983). 
 25 BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:  THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 141–42 (1998). 
 26 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2649 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (acknowledging the rationality test as the basis of Congressional au-
thority under the Commerce Clause).   
 27 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (“The [Tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is re-
tained which has not been surrendered.”). 
 28 Dismissively perhaps, but not incorrectly.  As will be demonstrated in Part V, the Tenth 
Amendment does not lend itself well to interpretation—so much so that by the end of the 
twentieth Century, the Court is unable to articulate a principled interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause that incorporates principled interpretations of the Tenth Amendment. 
 29 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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stands for the proposition that the coincidence of the adjudication of 
economic activity in previous cases delimits the congressional authority.  
The focus in the Chief Justice’s opinion is on the “activity” and “non-
activity” distinction.  Both theories are justified on the basis that oth-
erwise, there would be no limit on Congress’s power, the conse-
quence being a national police power.  Missing from these argu-
ments, however, is any articulation of principle, for the precision by 
which the Court has chosen to draw its federalist lines, and certainly 
each justification is dependent upon subjective federalist preferences 
of some members of the Court.  Indeed the current jurisprudence 
does not pretend to follow the textual connection to the “among the 
several states” language in the Clause, which was the primary basis of 
pre-1937 Commerce Clause opinions.30 
But returning to the text of the Commerce Clause without the in-
terference of the substantial effects doctrine as it was used in 1936 
and afterward would be the only principled way to re-invigorate earli-
er understandings of the Clause that incorporated dual sovereignty 
principles into the definition of commerce as Justice Thomas sug-
gested in his concurrence in Lopez and separate dissent in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.31  Doing this would contain 
whatever perceived danger of the creation of a national police power 
by locating dual sovereignty principles in the definition of Congress’s 
commercial power and create a limiting principle based on congres-
sional regulation only of economic activity “among the several 
states.”32 
Yet without a broadly utilized substantial effects doctrine, the Se-
cond New Deal could not have produced legislation designed to ad-
dress a specific problem during a specific moment in the country’s 
economic history and survive constitutional scrutiny—hence the radi-
cal change left was designed for the emergency at hand.  Yet, despite 
the changes in the national economy in the last eighty years, the con-
 
 30 As will be developed in Part III.B, the Court’s reasoning in Commerce Clause cases in-
cluded the argument that a particular regulated activity bore a “close and substantial rela-
tion” to interstate commerce.  This rationale has been viewed as based on the Necessary 
and Proper Clause allowing Congress to pass implementing legislation in furtherance of 
its enumerated powers.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in judgment). 
 31 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Thomas, J. concurring) (“If we wish to be true to a Constitution 
that does not cede police power to the Federal Government, our Commerce Clause’s 
boundaries simply cannot be ‘defined’ as being ‘commensurate with the national 
needs . . . .’”);  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2649 (2012) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
32  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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stitutional doctrines that were introduced as emergency measures 
have been maintained in much calmer times creating a regulatory 
state and congressional power affecting everything from pensions to 
civil rights.  In other words, the New Deal remains a vital part of the 
nation’s economy.  Essentially, a national regulatory system has been 
created since 1937 based upon the substantial effects test.  Jettisoning 
the test would undermine a significant amount of national regula-
tion.  The possibility of a major disruption of the national regulatory 
system aside, the events of 2008 and after demonstrate the need for a 
flexible constitutional approach to the national economy and the 
substantial effects test provides that flexibility.  It is a flexibility that is 
perhaps better checked by the political process and not by artificial, 
and, as will be demonstrated, ultimately subjective distinctions whose 
sole purpose is to check national economic power. 
In reviewing National Federation and the Court’s focus on limiting 
principles on Congress’s use of the Commerce Clause, the article will 
examine and distinguish the bases for the current push and the pre-
1937 Commerce Clause opinions.  It will suggest that the earlier ju-
risprudence’s limiting principles were based on a more principled 
constitutional theory.  It will also demonstrate how the New Deal 
Commerce jurisprudence so overwhelmed the earlier arguments of 
the meaning of “among the several states” through the substantive ef-
fects test that only two judicial options are available now to roll back 
the congressional role in economic regulation.  Under the first op-
tion, the Court can continue its recent attempts to restrain the com-
merce power through artificial non-textual theories based solely on 
an insertion into the definition of interstate commerce dual sover-
eignty concerns about a national police power.  Under the second 
option, it can dismantle the substantive effects test, an approach that 
would essentially challenge present day understandings of a national 
economy.  The article will demonstrate that the latter is a more prin-
cipled, yet costly (and unlikely), strategy of the Court, while the for-
mer has no solid basis in constitutional theory.  The net result is, and 
should be, retention of post-New Deal Commerce Clause principles 
allowing the political process to police the Tenth Amendment’s tru-
ism emanations. 
II.  LIMITING PRINCIPLES, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND CAROLENE 
PRODUCTS’  FOOTNOTE FOUR 
As described in this article, the search for limiting principles on 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause following the judi-
cial changes of the late 1930s has ranged from deference to the will 
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of Congress to the tighter scrutiny of the Supreme Court in later 
years.  The article takes the obvious position that where the Court 
sought to employ a tighter rein on commercial legislation, it utilized 
a better doctrinal and principled case before 1937 than it did in the 
modern incarnation of that effort.  The modern attempts found a 
limiting principle in state government as employer (National League of 
Cities v. Usery33) which was later overruled,34 in the re-characterization 
of the Commerce Clause doctrine as one based upon Congress’s au-
thority to regulate economic activities only (United States v. Lopez35), a 
characterization which itself has no connection to federalist princi-
ples, and in the latest activity/inactivity disqualifying distinction of 
National Federation.  But in seeking to satisfy in some way a particular 
idea of the Tenth Amendment federalism, separation of powers con-
cerns are undermined.  The result is that the essence of judicial activ-
ism has been exhibited in those periods when the Court did not ade-
quately defer to the judgment of the democratically elected legislative 
bodies, on matters of policy, often demonstrating its “readiness to in-
vent new constitutional rules not directly derivable from the text of 
the Constitution.”36 
Of course the Civil Rights Movement was aided by the kind of ju-
dicial decision making many considered, at the time, judicial activ-
ism,37 though few serious people today would regard finding state laws 
mandating separate but equal facilities, and laws that required sepa-
rate facilities without regard to equality, unconstitutional to be a bad 
thing.  But Brown v. Board of Education38 and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada39 were activist decisions to the extent that they overturned leg-
islation passed by democratically elected bodies and did not defer to 
those legislative judgments.  Yet there is a distinction between the 
kinds of activism demonstrated in those early civil rights cases and 
what appears to be on display in Commerce Clause decisions of late. 
 
 33 426 U.S. 833 (1976); see infra discussion at Part IV.A. 
 34 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that the Fair 
Labor Standards Act did not violate the Commerce Clause when applied to employees of 
the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority). 
 35 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549. 
 36 LOUIS LUSKY, OUR NINE TRIBUNES:  THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN AMERICA 13 (1993). 
 37 David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered, 114 YALE L.J. 
591 (2004) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:  THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004)). 
 38 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 39 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
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The Court’s decision in United States v. Carolene Products40 provides 
a justification for this dichotomy.  The Court let stand congressional 
legislation prohibiting the sale in interstate commerce of adulterated 
milk of which milk fat was replaced with a substitute.  After making 
the case for the regulation’s constitutionality under the Commerce 
Clause and the plenary power to regulate commerce among the sev-
eral states, the Court addressed the Fifth Amendment concerns un-
der the Due Process Clause prohibition against property takings.  On 
that issue the Court stated: 
 Even in the absence of such aids [legislative findings] the existence of 
facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regu-
latory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to 
be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made 
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude 
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.41 
The language is noteworthy not simply for being a clear declara-
tion of a deferential judicial policy that the Court was to employ from 
that point forward for years in Due Process cases; it is also noteworthy 
for the footnote attached to it.  Footnote Four is credited with laying 
out the justification for heightened scrutiny in matters addressing civ-
il and political rights and discrimination against “discrete and insular 
minorities” before the court.42  Because errors on the part of legisla-
 
 40 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 41 Id. at 152. 
 42 Footnote Four reads: 
 “There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitu-
tion, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when 
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.  See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-
370; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452.   
 It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. On restrictions 
upon the right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73; 
on restraints upon the dissemination of information, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 
283 U.S. 697, 713-714, 718-720, 722; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233; Lovell v. 
Griffin, supra; on interferences with political organizations, see Stromberg v. California, su-
pra, 369; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-378; Herndon 
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, and see Holmes, J., in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673; as to 
prohibition of peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365. 
 Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes 
directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, or national, Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 
or racial minorities, Nixon v. Herndon, supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra: whether prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously 
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tures, including Congress, in these kinds of cases, take an unaccepta-
ble toll on the democratic process—by undermining the means of 
democratic “repeal of undesirable legislation”43 (a problem not iden-
tifiable in litigation raising federalism concerns),44 —deference alone, 
in the form of rational basis analysis, would be inappropriate in the 
areas outlined in the Footnote.  Carving out those concerns leaves 
other matters, particularly economic regulation, to the good sense of 
the elected Congress with the Court applying a rational basis scruti-
ny—admittedly a minimal scrutiny—to the process, thereby preclud-
ing a carte blanche on the part of legislative bodies.45 
 
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 
Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428; South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 
177, 184, n 2, and cases cited.” 
 43 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (1938). 
 44 See infra discussion of Garcia at Part V.B.  Our system of federalism must certainly be re-
garded as a foundational attribute of the American polity.  As Justice Kennedy pointed 
out in Lopez, “In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the peo-
ple is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to 
each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.  Hence a double security aris-
es to the rights of the people.  The different governments will control each other, at the 
same time that each will be controlled by itself,” 514 U.S. at 576 (quoting THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 51, at 350–51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).  As Professor Lusky de-
scribes the background to Carolene Products Footnote Four, the Court’s “latitudinarian in-
terpretation of the Due Process Clauses” (and the term liberty in particular) prior to 
1937, bore some fruit in the area of civil rights and civil liberties.  LUSKY, supra note 36, at 
122.  However with the break from this jurisprudence in 1937, the principle of deference 
threatened to undermine progress in this area.  Footnote Four was designed to exempt 
rights that could affect the political process, and to protect those groups that were partic-
ularly vulnerable to majoritarian political preferences.  Those rights, as well as the specific 
rights of the Bill of Rights, became subject to heightened scrutiny.  It is the particular 
vulnerability of political rights that lay in the development of the language in the Foot-
note.  Id. at 122–27.  Political considerations of federalism included a less absolute poten-
tial for failure than the categories covered in Footnote Four.  As was Justice Blackmun’s 
point in Garcia, discussed infra Part V.B, the rationale for heightened scrutiny does not 
exist in matters having to do with federalism.  Undesirable legislation, or legislators can 
be removed via the political process, whereas politically discriminatory or oppressive legis-
lation cannot typically be corrected through by the same means.  See Garcia, 469 U.S. 528 
(1985). 
 45 This reasoning in favor of deference to Congress in economic matters was made part of 
the Commerce Clause jurisprudence in Katzenbach v. McClung, where the Court employed 
a rational basis test to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its prohibition of segregation in 
privately owned facilities.  379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964).  As Justice Souter explained in his 
dissent in Lopez, “because complete elimination of the direct/indirect effects dichotomy 
and acceptance of the cumulative effects doctrine . . . so far settled the pressing issues of 
congressional power over commerce as to leave the Court for years without any need to 
phrase a test explicitly deferring to rational legislative judgments.” 514 U.S. at 607 (Sout-
er, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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 This is doubtful.  By virtue of an insistence on specific notions 
of the concept of an “activity” being apparent in congressional asser-
tions of authority, several members of the Court are of the opinion 
that more than Congress’s statement of a rational basis for commer-
cial legislation is warranted in cases where the Tenth Amendment is 
an issue because prior to Lopez, there was no foundation for that posi-
tion.46  This would be a new gloss on Commerce Clause litigation 
when one considers the fact that those cases, by their very nature, 
raise Tenth Amendment concerns, some greater than others, and the 
Court in the past has declined to press this issue in deference to the 
separation of powers principle.  To do so at this point brings into 
question prior cases that did not explicitly address federalism con-
cerns out of deference to Congress.  As will be discussed later, to the 
Court majority in Lopez, the issue of whether the covered activity, gun 
possession was economic, was a federalism issue.  The fact that the 
Court had not addressed a case so distinct from economic activity in-
dicates, according to this reasoning, that previous decisions were 
cognizant of Tenth Amendment concerns.  However, in reality, once 
the post-1937 Court decided that the power was plenary in Congress, 
federalism became a non-issue to the Court which deferred to the 
wisdom of the Congress, reserving only a rational basis check on that 
power47 until it reappeared in Lopez in the guise of economic activity. 
Members of the Court who feel that Congress has tended to abuse 
the commercial power have sought a limiting principle that is consti-
tutionally questionable in two respects.  First, as will be demonstrated 
later in this article, the principles developed have been outside of the 
constitutional text because the use and approval of necessary and 
proper assertions of the commercial power have so overwhelmed the 
alternative position of congressional commercial authority that the 
Court would have to overrule decades of post-1937 Court opinions 
deferring to Congress on matters of the exercise of that power, to re-
turn to the pre-1937 standard that will be described in the next sec-
tion.  Moreover, the search itself is constitutionally unnecessary be-
cause it raises questions of a sort of judicial activism not justified by 
the political theory behind the exception to the judicial deference 
carved out in Carolene Products Footnote Four.  Maintenance of the 
federal system through political means is both feasible and preferable 
to vesting decisions of such magnitude in an appointed judiciary. 
 
 46 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2649 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 47 McClung, 379 U.S. at 302–04. 
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III. BEFORE 1937—FEDERALISM, COMMERCIAL REGULATION, AND 
LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
The history of the Commerce Clause can perhaps be divided into 
four parts.  For the better part of the Constitution’s first century, the 
Commerce Clause was seen primarily as a basis for assessing state 
power in commercial matters in relation to the plenary power of the 
federal government—today referred to as Dormant or Negative 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.48  Instead of monitoring how closely 
Congress complied with the parameters of its authority, the Court in 
the first period focused primarily on protecting the plenary power 
from state encroachment. 
In the second period, beginning in the late nineteenth century to 
just prior to President Roosevelt’s second term, the Supreme Court 
seemed preoccupied with containing the powerful source of congres-
sional authority with theories strictly interpreted from the text of the 
Clause.  By the time of the Great Depression, the commercial power 
had not developed into the all-encompassing force that it would be-
come after 1937, the first year of the second term and what is called 
the Second New Deal.  This third period saw an expanded use of the 
Commerce power due to more open interpretations of the Clause—a 
period that lasted arguably until the middle of the 1990s. 
A fourth period is the period during which the Court attempted 
to restrain the “New Deal Commerce Clause” in a manner that was 
perhaps detached from the text of the Constitution.  The Court be-
gan a period of re-regulation of Congress from what many of its 
members regarded as a clear command of the document to limit fed-
eral power whenever it overlapped its boundaries.  As will be dis-
cussed, this command is far from clear textually. 
A.  Early Formulations of the Commerce Power—Nineteenth Century Negative 
Commerce Jurisprudence 
The Commerce Clause is particularly susceptible to the downside 
of what Chief Justice Marshall described as an attribute of the United 
States Constitution.  In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall 
established that the abbreviated descriptions of the powers of Con-
gress in section 8 of Article I would not work as a straitjacket, but as 
an opening to employ whatever methods “necessary and proper” for 
the accomplishment of the legitimate enumerated ends in the provi-
 
 48 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852). 
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sion.49  The Necessary and Proper Clause was a crucial part of the de-
velopment and description of a national federal power because it 
provided the means of implementation.  Other national constitution-
al traditions might and have since chosen more comprehensive ways 
of defining governmental power, particularly in the economic area.  
Compared to the economic provisions of more recent constitutions 
and treaty-based constitutional documents the language is rather pal-
try.50  However our Constitution’s brevity has become almost a trade-
mark of sorts since Chief Justice Marshall said anything more detailed 
would be essentially a code, and not a constitution.51  The result has 
been nearly two centuries of constitutional controversy over the 
meaning of several constitutional provisions, most notably the two 
that figure most prominently in this discussion, the Commerce 
Clause and the Tenth Amendment. 
Marshall and his successors on the Court did not give twentieth 
century courts much to work with—most of the cases involving com-
mercial regulation in the early to mid-nineteenth century addressed 
the negative aspects of the commercial power to restrain state regula-
tion within the area reserved for Congress’s plenary commercial pow-
er.52  But the early cases provided that though the power was plenary, 
the states might regulate the same things in the same way for differ-
ent reasons, implying some overlap between state and federal author-
ity.53 
 
 49 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413 (1819). 
 50 Craig Jackson, Constitutional Structure and Governance Strategies for Economic Integration in 
Africa and Europe, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 164–67 (2003) (discussing 
the level of detail in the economic provisions of the Treaty of Rome and the Constitutive 
Document for African Union). 
 51 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407. 
 52 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 17 (1824) (“The States may legislate, it is said, wherever Congress has 
not made a plenary exercise of its power.  But who is to judge whether Congress has made 
this plenary exercise of power?”); Cooley, 53 U.S. at 305 (1852) (reinforcing that “[t]he de-
cision in Gibbons v. Ogden has never been in the least degree questioned or shaken”). 
 53 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196 (implicating federal authority when stating, “[t]his power, like all 
others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution”).  Of course, 
Gibbons has been used to support both expansive and narrow readings of the commerce 
power.  Consider the exchange between Justice Sotomayor and Paul Clement, attorney 
for the respondents in oral arguments in Department of Health and Human Services v. Flori-
da: 
  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:  But that’s exactly what Justice Marshall said in Gibbons.  He said 
that it is the power to regulate; the power like all others vested in Congress is complete in 
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than 
those prescribed in the Constitution.  But there is no conscription in the—set forth in the 
Constitution— 
  MR. CLEMENT:  I agree— 
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Accordingly, Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been as rudder-
less a jurisprudence as one can imagine given the brevity of the 
Clause, the susceptibility to multiple meanings of early court opinions 
purporting to explain the Clause, and the willingness of judges to use 
their own judgments of economic policy to define what was surely 
recognized as an open power amenable to anyone’s interpretation.  
Yet despite this indeterminate quality, a principled limiting principle 
was possibly rooted in the language of the Clause—“among the sever-
al states.”54  Though susceptible to any number of plausible meanings, 
“among the states” suggests at the very least some kind of motion, a 
mingling or interaction of a commercial product with multiple states.  
It does not suggest, at least plausibly, anything more. 
B.  Gilded Age Commerce Clause Jurisprudence 
Concurrent with the first Supreme Court cases addressing con-
gressional assertions of authority under the Commerce Clause was 
the American Industrial Revolution, the development of the modern 
corporation and federal laws to regulate them, and legal rights ac-
corded the institution under the Fourteenth Amendment.55 
Contrary to congressional policy designs to regulate the national 
problem of trusts and their deleterious effects on competition56 was 
the Court’s interpretation of “among the several states.”  The limited 
meaning was the dominant constitutional presumption of the Court 
at that time.  That interpretation produced rulings against federal 
power in economic activity if that activity was not actually in com-
merce “among the states” or that did not directly affect such com-
merce.  The second descriptor (direct effects) acknowledged that 
federal power was not limited to items actually in transit across state 
borders—that even a conservative approach to commerce would ac-
 
  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:  —with respect to regulating commerce. 
  MR. CLEMENT:  I agree 100 percent, and I think that was the Chief Justice’s point, which 
was once you open the door to compelling people into commerce based on the narrow 
rationales that exist in this industry, you are not going to be able to stop that process.  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 77–78, Department of Health and Human Services v. 
Florida, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf. 
 54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 55 Harry Scheiber, State Law and “Industrial Policy” in American Development, 1790–1987, 75 
CALIF. L. REV. 415, 418 (1987) (arguing that, in addition to federal policies, “state indus-
trial policies have had a significant impact and can be effective in important respects so 
long as they are not impeded or counteracted by national industrial policies”). 
 56 Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:  Price Fixing and Market Division, 
74 YALE L. J. 775, 831 (1965) (suggesting that courts adopted a goal of wealth promo-
tion—via competition—to the exclusion of competing alternative ends). 
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commodate internal activity that directly affected interstate com-
merce.  According to the Court in United States v. E. C. Knight,57 feder-
al regulation must directly affect those matters identified as commerce 
among the several states.  Inasmuch as anything short of the regula-
tion of items in transit or that otherwise are closely related to those 
items was prohibited,  
“direct effects” is essentially a matter of identity—the regulation must 
actually be or “touch” the interstate commerce.  All else not falling 
within that precise definition of federal power was exclusively within 
the authority of the states.  As a result, a coalition of sugar manufac-
turers in Pennsylvania controlling the majority of the national sugar 
market was not reachable under the Sherman Act because manufac-
turing was deemed stationary and hence intrastate and not part of or 
touching moving traffic among the states.58 
The Court’s approach in E. C. Knight has been termed as repre-
senting the doctrine of dual federalism, which treats state and federal 
areas of authority as separate, distinct, and inviolable, eschewing all 
areas of possible overlap.59  And though the Court took great pains to 
define its terms (“[t]hat which belongs to commerce is within the ju-
risdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong to 
commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the 
State,”60) the direct effects test was an acknowledgment of the inter-
section between internal and external commerce proposed by the 
early negative Commerce Clause cases (though this acknowledgment 
in those cases tended toward defining state police power and not ex-
panding federal authority).61  However, the Court’s direct affects ju-
risprudence drew a narrow focus that did not include the creation of 
the items that later became interstate commerce—manufacturing 
and production were deemed neither commerce, nor as directly af-
 
 57 156 U.S. at 12 (asserting that if the exercise of the power results in bringing the operation 
of commerce into play—but only affects it incidentally and indirectly—then the power 
does not control it). 
 58 Id.  The Court quotes from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons:  “Commerce, un-
doubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more:  it is intercourse.  It describes the commer-
cial intercourse between nations and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated 
by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.”  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189–
90 (1824). 
 59 BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:  THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 142 (1998) (“In practice, the theory of dual federalism 
yielded a narrow construction of the scope of the federal government’s power to regulate 
commerce.”). 
 60 United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895). 
 61 Id. 
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fecting commerce.62  Because corporate decisions of the parties af-
fecting the essentially in-state practice of manufacturing were said to 
only remotely affect interstate commerce, it was not interpreted to be 
interstate commerce and subject to the Commerce Clause. 
The Court’s opinion and its dual federalist approach to commer-
cial matters suggest rigidity in its division of power between the states 
and the federal government, but not necessarily in the definition of 
the federal commercial authority.  The Court defined that authority 
as encompassing not just commerce among the several states, but also 
those matters directly affecting commerce (without resort to the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause), all while staying within the text of the 
Constitution. 
Yet the federalism debate had its limits.  Cases involving state po-
lice power were also subject to attack by the Court by virtue of the 
claim that individual substantive due process rights of contract were 
violated.63  The Court found a right to contract as among the body of 
unarticulated rights protected by the Due Process Clause when it 
turned back a minimum hours law passed by the New York legislature 
in Lochner v. New York,64 a case that continued as precedent through 
the late 1930s.  The proposition of that case and those that followed 
was that of rigidity in the parsing of regulatory power to the states, 
supposedly the possessor of infinite police power.  When added to 
the Commerce Clause jurisprudence and a Congress whose power 
was contained in specific enumerations of authority, what one gets is 
the jurisprudential script of the Gilded Age Supreme Court, tradi-
tionally regarded in constitutional law literature as driven by an eco-
nomic jurisprudence of the day which constrained both federal and 
state regulation in key areas.65 
With regard to the Commerce Clause, the fact that Chief Justice 
Marshall had interpreted the Constitution almost a century earlier as 
saying that Congress had the authority to do all that was necessary 
and proper to implement its authority was not terribly clarifying in 
the federalism debate—instead it has guaranteed nearly two centuries 
of debate about the meaning of the Clause. 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 46 (1905) (holding that freedom of contract is a right 
protected by the Constitution). 
 64 Id. at 64–65. 
 65 Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (noting that Lochner 
was widely regarded as an “illegitimate intrusion by the courts into a realm properly re-
served to the political branches of government”). 
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Accordingly, the Court of this era consistently held to its textually 
based limiting principle in commerce cases.  At the same time, it re-
served the right to address the definition of commerce in a manner 
that seemed expansive.  The Court’s interpretation of the commerce 
power in the Houston, East and West Texas Railroad Co. v. United States,66 
known as the Shreveport Rate Case, exemplify this.  Justice Hughes 
wrote that the Commerce Power: 
[N]ecessarily embraces the right to control their operations in all 
matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traf-
fic that the control is essential or appropriate to the security of that 
traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate service, and to the mainte-
nance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be con-
ducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance.67 
Where the Court in E. C. Knight focused on the identity of items as 
actually being in commerce, the Court in Shreveport was willing to find 
authority to regulate matters (like setting transportation rates) having 
a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic, an obvious use of 
necessary and proper authority.68  Similarly the Court was willing to 
accept congressional authority over meat pricing practices over meat 
products in transit through several states.69  The point in common in 
each case is that the focus of the decisions can be traced to the text of 
the Clause itself—identity of the subject of regulation as within inter-
state commerce or directly touching and facilitating the movement of 
specific interstate commerce. 
Even in the so-called “morality cases,” though the Court showed a 
willingness to accept a broad view of congressional power even where 
the motive may not have been strictly economic, its focus did not 
stray far from the text of the Clause.  For example in cases dealing 
with the federal regulation of lottery tickets70 and prostitution,71 the 
item or activity was classifiable as commercial, and because the juris-
dictional basis for the legislation was movement across a state line, 
the Court found Congress’s assertion of power constitutional.  On the 
other hand, where child labor was involved in the manufacture of 
goods engaged in interstate commerce, the Court held its ground on 
the manufacturing issue and declined to approve federal legislation 
 
 66 234 U.S. 342 (1914). 
 67 Id. at 351. 
 68 Id. (“Congress is empowered to regulate,—that is, to provide the law for the government 
of interstate commerce; to enact ‘all appropriate legislation’ for its ‘protection and ad-
vancement.’”(quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 561, 564 (1870))). 
 69 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905). 
 70 Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
 71 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913). 
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prohibiting the interstate sale of those items.72  Yet each of these deci-
sions maintained a certain consistency.  State and federal power were 
indeed separate while the definition of the power (actual goods in 
transit, manufacturing as not being commerce, transportation or 
channels, or streams of commerce being so closely related to com-
merce in interstate transit that congressional regulation was appro-
priate) remained somewhat flexible, but close to the actual move-
ment of specific commerce. 
The decisions may have reflected the economic thinking of the 
time or of the Court’s membership.  They may have reflected a legit-
imate or excessively cautious fear of encroaching federal government 
power on the states.  Yet the Court did draw its limiting principle 
from the language of the Clause itself—the identity of the matters 
regulated would have to be a part of the traffic across state lines or 
closely or directly related to those matters so identified—commerce 
among the several states. 
C.  New Deal Confrontation and the Need for Expansive Commercial Power to 
Legislate During the Great Depression 
The Great Depression drew the assumptions of the role of the 
federal government into question in a number of areas, and not the 
least of which was Congress’s regulatory authority under the Com-
merce Clause.  New Deal reformers would need more tools than what 
the Court’s narrow list would provide to the federal government 
through the commerce power.73  Because there was no precedent for 
the economic collapse, there was no legislative precedent for the kind 
of changes thought needed, and the New Deal reformers were treat-
ing the Constitution, and in particular the Commerce Clause, as an 
opportunity to get a desired goal accomplished—expand the role of 
the federal government in the national economy. Yet the jurispru-
dence of the Commerce Clause continued to uphold a limiting prin-
ciple based on the older cases focused on the concept of federalism 
traceable to the “among the several states” language of the Clause. 
 
 72 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271–74 (1918). 
 73 To Robert Jackson, writing before becoming a member of the Court, the government’s 
need for the means to address a national economic problem became subject to the feder-
alism not of the Constitution, but of the Supreme Court, which read into the document 
the notion of dual federalism.  Dual federalism, according to Jackson, restricted the na-
tional government from intrastate regulation despite nothing in the Constitution indicat-
ing any particular subject within exclusive control of the states.  JACKSON, supra note 14, at 
69–70. 
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Schechter Poultry v. United States74 dealt with the New Deal legislation 
known as the National Industrial Recovery Act, which required indus-
tries to adopt codes of fair competition, including minimum wages, 
collective bargaining, and the like.  The case involved a Brooklyn 
chicken slaughterer and a deficient Government record to prove a 
nexus between Brooklyn chicken slaughterers and the interstate 
poultry business, especially since Schechter, whose supply came from 
interstate commerce, sold only to in-state retailers.75 The Court ap-
plied the direct effects test, which Chief Justice Sutherland character-
ized as a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce: 
We have held that, in dealing with common carriers engaged in both 
interstate and intrastate commerce, the dominant authority of Con-
gress necessarily embraces the right to control their intrastate opera-
tions in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to in-
terstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to secure 
the freedom of that traffic from interference or unjust discrimination 
and to promote the efficiency of the interstate service.76 
(Given better facts) the idea that wages, even at Schechter’s small 
New York operation, could have an effect on interstate commerce was 
dismissed by Cardozo, who in concurrence noted that the connection 
was too imprecise and remote: 
Motion at the outer rim is communicated perceptibly, though mi-
nutely, to recording instruments at the center.  A society such as ours 
“is an elastic medium which transmits all tremors throughout its terri-
tory; the only question is of their size.”  The law is not indifferent to 
considerations of degree.  Activities local in their immediacy do not 
become interstate and national because of distant repercussions.77 
The fate of a chicken slaughterhouse would appear to be at least 
analogous to that involved in the sale of cattle in Swift & Co. v. United 
States.  However, the rationale for the rejection of the regulation 
here, and the acceptance of it in Swift, is consistent.  Schechter’s op-
eration was so isolated that a reasonable claim to national effect alone 
would not be realistic even though, as Cardozo acknowledges, 
Schechter’s practices would have some minor effect.  Swift involved 
livestock in the process of travel to market, and pricing practices facil-
itating the transit of that commerce.78  The difference in the two out-
comes is that the Court’s limiting principle was used as a quantitative 
metric in Schechter, (direct equals “a lot”) where the limiting principle 
 
 74 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521–23 (1935). 
 75 Id. at 520–21. 
 76 Id. at 544. 
 77 Id. at 554 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 78 196 U.S. 375, 391 (1905). 
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in previous cases was more closely associated with the identity of the 
activity itself or the closeness to specific commerce in transit between 
states.  Though textual, the distinction perhaps reveals that the limit-
ing principle that Congress’s authority extended only to traffic in 
commerce among the states was not warranted as the exclusive means 
of interpreting the Clause’s coverage other than to entertain the 
Court’s notion of where Tenth Amendment lines have to be drawn.79 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.80 involved the Bituminous Coal Act of 1935.  
Under the Act, penalties were assessed for non-compliance with the 
fair competition standards.  Because the matter involved labor and 
production, Justice Sutherland, for the majority, found no direct ef-
fect, explaining the limiting principle as an absence of efficient inter-
vening agency or condition.81  The question to be examined under 
this jurisprudence was not the extent of the local activity or condi-
tion, or the extent of the effect.  The question was what is the relation 
between the activity and the commerce—is the activity the interstate 
commerce itself or something close to it? 
IV. EXPANDING CONGRESS’S POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Following the 1936 landslide re-election of Franklin Roosevelt and 
the unveiling of the “Court Packing Plan,” the Court issued a series of 
opinions that differed significantly from its previous jurisprudence.  
Modern historical analysis confirms that the legend of the “switch in 
time that saved nine” really did not happen in such an obviously gra-
tuitous manner as had been suggested.82  Nonetheless, the Court 
 
 79 The Court’s attitude toward the utilitarian New Deal legislation can be summed up in the 
words of the Chief Justice:  “Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary reme-
dies.  But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies 
outside the sphere of constitutional authority.  Extraordinary conditions do not create or 
enlarge constitutional power.  The Constitution established a national government with 
powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but the-
se powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants.  Those who 
act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because they be-
lieve that more or different power is necessary.  Such assertions of extra-constitutional au-
thority were anticipated and precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth Amend-
ment . . . . ”     
  Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 528–29 (internal footnote omitted). 
 80 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 81 Id. at 307–08. 
 82 The “legend” arose when the Court issued its opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379 (1937), a Due Process Clause case which effectively overturned Lochner by up-
holding a state minimum wage law for women.  That decision however, was decided be-
fore Roosevelt’s announcement of the Court Packing plan and only released several 
weeks later.  Furthermore, it is suggested that the Court understood that political forces 
in the Senate were aligned to, at the very least, filibuster the plan or defeat it outright 
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gradually convened a jurisprudence that entertained a more expan-
sive role for Congress to go beyond the narrow confines of a com-
modity-based power, to a power designed to affect a national econo-
my—a power needed to address a national economic depression.  
The change involved a fundamental change in constitutional theory. 
The fundamental change was possible because both the Com-
merce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause are basically gen-
eral provisions capable of many meanings, though the conservatives 
on the pre-1937 Court sought to limit the meaning to actual traffic 
and those activities that so facilitated that traffic that there was an 
“absence of an efficiently intervening agency.”83  The Necessary and 
Proper Clause is even less specific and this lack of definitional clarity 
conveniently takes advantage of the excessively vague Tenth Amend-
ment in the sense that while defining what power is possessed by the 
states, it does not specify what power is prohibited to the national 
government nor prescribe an area of exclusivity to the states.84  Ac-
cordingly Roosevelt’s reformers exploited this opening to create con-
stitutional scope responsive to immediate needs of society.  Absent 
such an emergency, a theory of the constitution the old interpreta-
tion, one that satisfied the regulatory needs of a less dangerous era, 
would be just fine. 
But this was a dangerous era and the reformers, with a Court 
gradually changing, were able to put into operation an expansive view 
of the Commerce Clause.  In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp.,85 the Court finally recognized the theory that 
economic activities that are connected affect each other whether or 
not individually such activities take place entirely within a state or in 
both the state and across state borders, albeit in the context of a rela-
tively new kind of corporate endeavor, the extended interlocking in-
terstate corporation.86  The Court continued its reliance on the limit-
ing principle that Congress regulates only those matters so connected 
to interstate commerce that there was an absence of an efficient in-
tervening agency or condition, a rejection of such a principle was re-
ally not needed within the context of an interstate interlocking cor-
poration. 
 
when it issued the second opinion of the new jurisprudence in Commerce Clause cases, 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).  See CUSHMAN, supra note 59 at 
18–20. 
 83 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307 (1936). 
 84 JACKSON, supra note 14, at 69. 
 85 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 86 Id. at 25–27. 
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Later, with a Court comprised of seven Roosevelt appointees,87 it 
would abandon all pretense of remaining true to old thinking and es-
tablish that activities not attached in an interstate corporate structure 
may still affect commercial activities in other states by a device called 
aggregation in Wickard v. Filmore.88  One farmer’s protest over a wheat 
acreage cultivation limitation to grow product for private consump-
tion was acknowledged by the Court to be essentially insubstantial, 
but when combined with thousands of other farmers doing the same 
thing, in the aggregate the effect on interstate commerce would be 
substantial.89  A constitutional theory of economics that did not allow 
federal regulation over recurring economic events affecting the na-
tional economy would render the government helpless to address the 
problems of agricultural over-supply.90  This opinion, and others like 
it during the same time period, flew in the face of Justice Cardozo’s 
concurrence in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States91 where 
he compared the economy to an earthquake-monitoring device.  
Cardozo sought to describe an economy so interlocked and integrat-
ed that even modest economic activity could reverberate beyond its 
location.  This basic fact, in Cardozo’s view, himself a liberal, re-
quired some sort of limiting principle—absent a limiting principle 
Cardozo worried that the commerce power would undermine all lim-
itations on federal regulatory power.92  Wickard also ran afoul of Chief 
Justice Hughes’ warning that the Constitution could and should not 
be interpreted for specific outcomes no matter what the emergency.93  
So despite the warnings from a conservative and liberal of the preced-
ing era, the Administration and Congress put forth a legislative agen-
da with the help of a sympathetic “Roosevelt Court” picked by the 
President after a series of retirements after the Court-Packing Plan 
failed, giving him more influence over the future of economic consti-
 
 87 The Roosevelt appointees on the Court at the time of the Wickard decision were Hugo 
Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William Douglas, Frank Murphy, James Byrne, and 
Robert Jackson. 
 88 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 89 Id. at 128. 
 90 Id. at 129. 
 91 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (“There is a view of causation that 
would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities 
of commerce.  Motion at the outer rim is communicated perceptibly, though minutely, to 
recording instruments at the center.”). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 528–29. 
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tutional litigation for generations than a packed court of fifteen 
members likely would have.94 
Though National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Wickard v. Fil-
burn perhaps stand out as particularly stunning departures from pre-
vious doctrine, the former because of the timing, and the latter be-
cause of the sheer audacity of the aggregation theory, United States v. 
Darby may be the most important of the post-1936 Commerce Clause 
cases for two reasons.  First, the decision overturned the notorious 
“manufacturing is not commerce” opinion of Hammer v. Dagenhart 
that repudiated Congress’s power to regulate child labor.  The se-
cond reason is Justice Stone’s take on the Tenth Amendment: 
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained, which has not 
been surrendered.  There is nothing in the history of its adoption to 
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between 
the national and state governments as it had been established by the 
Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other 
than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to 
exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to 
exercise fully their reserved powers.95 
Stone’s relegation of the Tenth Amendment to the status of a rhe-
torical device underscores the position that the Court would take in 
Commerce Clause matters from that point on.  Even when the Court 
in the earlier cases applied the close and substantial relation test, it 
stuck with its “among the states” guns sanctioning rather obvious are-
as of federal jurisdiction because of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
Yet by the time Darby was before the Court, the jurisprudence had 
shifted substantially.  The use of the “close and substantial relation” 
doctrine had evolved, with the help of the Jones case, into the substan-
tial effects doctrine.  In doing so, it took congressional authority out-
side of the bounds of the Commerce Clause’s own limiting principle 
of “among the states.”  In theory, legislation under the Clause and the 
substantial effects doctrine would still be subject to the limiting prin-
ciple of the Tenth Amendment, but those limits would have to be de-
termined another way in light of Justice Stone’s truism characteriza-
tion. 
 
 94 This point is based on the speculation that the next Republican conservative President 
(Eisenhower) would also have a court of fifteen members and vacancies to appoint and 
the influence of the seven members appointed by Roosevelt would have been subject to 
the diluting affects of the Eisenhower’s appointments.  Of course President Eisenhower 
appointed perhaps the two most liberal justices of the twentieth century, Earl Warren and 
William Brennan. 
 95 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
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The result was that Congress was freer than it had been before to 
regulate for a variety of reasons, as long as even a tenuous connection 
to commerce or effects on commerce could be claimed.  Without 
what amounted to foundational change, much of the social and eco-
nomic history of the nation since then would be different. 
Civil rights is an interesting case study under this analysis.  Per-
haps the extremely naïve will believe that a sincere concern about the 
flow of traffic on the nation’s freeways, or the integrity of the hotel 
and restaurant industries motivated the Civil Rights Act of 1964.96  
The reality was that the country was being embarrassed international-
ly by its color line and racist treatment of people of color.  And it was 
a problem caused, in significant part, by cultural practices in both the 
public and private sector.  The Constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection had been rendered useless eighty years earlier in the pri-
vate sector by the 1881 Court’s literalist understanding of Equal Pro-
tection Clause’s prohibition of discriminatory state action,97 and there 
was nothing left with which to do the right thing other than to ma-
nipulate the Constitution through the Commerce Clause.  It is not 
very likely that the Clause was intended to do anything other than “fix 
economic problems,” and even that phrase may be taking it too far 
considering what Justice Thomas terms the mercantilist roots of the 
Clause.98  Nonetheless the manipulation took place and the theoreti-
cal underpinnings for it came straight out of the New Deal.  Certainly 
the Clause had been used for social legislation before—lottery cards,99 
prostitution,100 and the like—but in each of the earlier cases, the ob-
ject of social policy was actually crossing state borders as commerce, 
the quintessential Commerce Clause case.  As the Clause did not in-
clude an intent requirement in its authorization of the power, Con-
gress was able to use the substantial effects doctrine to make social 
policy simply by the fact that the activity, in this case an activity which 
was evil at the time and by today’s standards, affected interstate travel 
and hence interstate commerce.  So segregation in public restaurants 
and accommodations was said to substantially affect interstate travel 
and on this basis, in addition to the interstate products that were used 
to run such businesses, Congress’s assertion of authority was ap-
 
 96 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964) (suggesting that 
racial discrimination placed a heavy burden on interstate commerce). 
 97 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is State action of a particular character 
that is prohibited.  Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the 
[Fourteenth] [A]mendment.”). 
 98 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 591–92 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 99 Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 343–44 (1903). 
100 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 317 (1913). 
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proved by the Court.  Yet the hotel segregation practiced at Heart of 
Atlanta Motel101 or the “barbecue” segregation of Ollie’s Barbecue102 
both occurred within the states of Georgia and Alabama respective-
ly.103  A Court bound by a limiting principle that prohibited congres-
sional regulation of wholly intrastate activities that did not have a 
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce, would not have 
found the Civil Rights Act of 1964 constitutional.104  Similar results 
would occur were the Court bound to a limiting principle requiring a 
strict economic purpose.  Congress’s word that the Act was a rational 
assertion of power would suffice for the 1964 Warren Court.105  And 
certainly the evidence available in the legislative history of the Act 
suggested that segregation did have economic effects.  Yet, Justice 
Cardozo’s warning thirty years earlier in Schechter Poultry106 that every-
thing has an economic effect to some degree, if heeded in 1964, 
would have demanded a limiting principle requiring that the Act be 
struck down whether or not such limits would have a clear constitu-
tional basis. 
In reality the Act was a needed solution to a wrenching social 
problem that was not going to be fixed any other way.  The Com-
merce Clause attributes of the Civil Rights Act was also a step further 
than New Deal laws which were at least legitimately about economic 
policy.  Any pretense of economics as a prime motivator in the Civil 
Rights legislation is fantasy.  It was simply about a budding social 
movement and the need to restore and assert American prestige and 
moral authority at home and abroad.107 
 
101 379 U.S. at 243 (“Prior to passage of the Act the motel had followed a practice of refusing 
to rent rooms to Negroes, and it alleged that it intended to continue to do so.  In an ef-
fort to perpetuate that policy this suit was filed.”). 
102 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296–97 (1964) (detailing the segregation at a 
southern barbeque restaurant). 
103 The Court in both cases attempted to buttress the substantial effects reasoning with addi-
tional rationales.  The channels of trade rationale in the case of motel segregation, ad-
dressed the individual African Americans being denied service while traveling the inter-
state freeways.  The Court in the Katzenbach decision argued that Congress’s civil rights 
legislation was really about regulating goods being used in the restaurant in question. 
104 Congress was not attempting to regulate the actual flow of commerce across state lines as 
in Hoke, 227 U.S. at 317, or Champion, 188 U.S. at 323, or regulate activities necessary for 
the facilitation of specific commerce as in the Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 345 
(1914), or Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 391–92 (1905). 
105 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258. 
106 See note 74 and accompanying text. 
107 Donald H. Regan, How to Think about the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite 
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 602 (1995) (“An argument I have not even 
mentioned is that Congress was justified in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because 
race discrimination in the South was an embarrassment in our international relations.” 
(internal footnote omitted)). 
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It is likely that even if the Civil Rights Cases108 of the nineteenth 
century had not made the Fourteenth Amendment useless to attack 
private discrimination and was available in the 1960s, resort to the 
Commerce Clause would have been unnecessary.  But there likely 
would have been a call for a limiting principle to rein in Congress 
from interfering with private relationships through the Amendment’s 
state action language, a scenario that could have sent Congress back 
to the drawing board from which they would likely have arrived at a 
Commerce Clause solution to private discrimination anyway.  Because 
societies do not choose their history, the New Deal Commerce Clause 
was available to the Congress during the nation’s Civil Rights Move-
ment.  Even though the civil rights legislation had the social policy 
legislation that was approved by the pre-New Deal Court in the moral-
ity cases (within the context of regulating undesirable items of inter-
state commerce),109 Congress set about to regulate what it character-
ized as an impediment to interstate commerce (racial segregation), 
which was at best fortuitous since eradication of segregation absent 
state action was the true motive.110  The pre-New Deal morality cases 
were not precedent for this scope and but for the substantial effects 
doctrine of the New Deal Commerce Clause, the effort would have 
been unsuccessful.111 
The Great Depression and the New Deal were the stimuli for a 
new constitutional approach that led to changes in government that 
produced legislative outcomes removed temporally and by scope 
from the issues of the Great Depression.  Civil rights are such an ex-
ample.  A foundational shift of constitutional thinking was required 
and to do that constitutional theory had to let go of the idea that the 
Constitution was a collection of single truths and that the role of the 
 
108 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
109 See, e.g., Hoke, 227 U.S. at 317; Champion, 188 U.S. at 323. 
110 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 257. 
111 The crisis of the Depression likely created the pressure necessary to push the constitu-
tional principle, at least in the area of the Commerce Clause, in a new direction.  Lesser 
crises sustained the New Deal innovation.  Perhaps one reason why there was no crisis 
atmosphere surrounding the civil rights emergency in this country on the order of the 
Great Depression was that, though the victims of public and private sector racism might 
feel otherwise (and they do), the crisis of race in this country did not reach the level of 
emergency outside of minority communities faced by the nation during the Great De-
pression in terms of numbers affected.  Outside of African Americans and other non-
whites receiving civil treatment for the first time from private institutions and businesses, 
those institutions and businesses, and the hardcore racists who were rankled by the 
changes, most white Americans did not feel the change directly, observing it mostly in 
media and in their environments.  Though the social changes that flowed from the civil 
rights era were profound, few were in pain before the changes other than non-white 
Americans. 
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courts was to find those single truths.  In fact, the Constitution be-
came a collection of multiple truths and it was up to the political pro-
cess to use the truths that best addressed the crisis of a given mo-
ment.  In essence, with the Tenth Amendment rendered as a truism, 
it was up to Congress to certify the rationality of its legislation and 
create its own limiting principles. 
V. RE-EMERGENCE OF FEDERALISM IN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE—LIMITATION THEORIES 
A.  National League of Cities and Its Brief Reign 
By the mid-1970s, a mini-skirmish over federalism and Congress’s 
commercial jurisdiction was taking place (“mini” in comparison to 
the 1930s).  Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), Congress, 
using its commercial power, had taken to passing legislation regulat-
ing not only matters within state jurisdiction under the close and sub-
stantial effects doctrine, but was using essentially the same rationale 
to regulate the states themselves in their labor practices toward their 
own workforce of state government workers.  In National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery,112 the Supreme Court squarely faced the question of 
whether cities were subject to congressional regulation, and the 
Court said “no” on federalism grounds.  Writing for the Court, then 
Associate Justice William Rehnquist essentially called the law a step 
too far.  According to Rehnquist, the FLSA displaced state authority 
in areas of traditional government authority essentially substituting its 
judgment for that of the states in matters encompassing their own af-
fairs, in this case the employment of their own work force.113  The ap-
pellants challenging the legislation did not challenge the breadth of 
congressional authority, nor did the decision restrict Congress from 
regulating state policies—under the theory developed by the Court 
during the second New Deal, Congress would have authority to regu-
late those activities that were closely and substantially related or af-
fected interstate commerce.  But National League did draw the line at 
traditional governmental functions.  Taking a structural interpretive 
approach, Rehnquist’s opinion stated: 
 
112 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
113 Several years later, Justice Marshall articulated what has come to be accepted as a com-
plete test for government intrusion raised in National League.  The standard from Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc. considers whether Congress is regulating 
states as states, addresses matters that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty, and 
analyzes whether the regulation interferes with traditional state functions.  452 U.S. 264, 
287–88 (1981). 
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We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereign-
ty attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by 
Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of leg-
islative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution 
prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner.114 
Without limiting the breadth of congressional authority (which 
would require overruling the previous forty years of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence), Justice Rehnquist inserted the Tenth 
Amendment into the debate by quoting from Fry v. United States: 
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a “truism,” 
stating merely that “all is retained which has not been surrendered,” 
United States v. Darby, it is not without significance.  The Amendment 
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not ex-
ercise power in a fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their 
ability to function effectively in a federal system.115 
Chief Justice Rehnquist might well have added the remainder of 
that footnote in the case, which found in favor of Congress’s authori-
ty to stabilize price and wage levels by setting wage ceilings applicable 
to both private and state sectors: 
Despite the extravagant claims on this score made by some amici, we 
are convinced that the wage restriction regulations constituted no 
such drastic invasion of state sovereignty.116 
The decision from the previous term, in approving the federal 
regulation, noted the minimal intrusiveness of the FLSA in that case 
as well as in an earlier challenge in Maryland v. Wirtz.117  Fry involved a 
temporary measure enacted in response to a national inflation emer-
gency and Wirtz involved a minimum wage law that Justice Harlan 
characterized as simply regulating wages, and not policies in the state 
employment sectors (hospitals, education, institutions) affected.118  
Justice Marshall writing for the Court in Fry saw similarities between 
the two cases and saw both uses of the wage legislation as minimally 
invasive.119  The law challenged in National League was a “permanent” 
minimum wage law, more akin to Wirtz than Fry. 
However, the Court in National League overruled the Wirtz opinion 
while leaving Fry intact.  In Justice Rehnquist’s judgment, whereas a 
temporary emergency measure may be justifiable even from a struc-
tural standpoint (“The limits imposed upon the commerce power 
 
114 Nat’l League, 426 U.S. at 845. 
115 Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975). 
116 Id. 
117 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
118 Id. at 186–87. 
119 Fry, 421 U.S. at 548. 
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when Congress seeks to apply it to the States are not so inflexible as 
to preclude temporary enactments tailored to combat a national 
emergency.”120), a more permanent measure like the one in Wirtz or 
in National League, setting wages in employment sectors that included 
state employees, would not be.  Justice Harlan’s analysis in the 
Court’s opinion in Wirtz of the similar law, though limited to certain 
enterprises (an earlier version of the FLSA provision reviewed in Na-
tional League) was essentially that it was only wage regulation.121  Jus-
tice Rehnquist preferred to examine the degree by which wages 
might affect policies in traditional state functions, while acknowledg-
ing that “many of the actual effects under the proposed amendments 
remain a matter of some dispute among the parties . . . .”122  The re-
sultant examination was as speculative in the direction of intrusive-
ness as Harlan’s was in the direction of non-intrusiveness.  Neither 
decision focused on the scope of applicability, the law in Wirtz being 
of a more narrow application than the one in National League.  Both 
opinions focused on the temporal nature of the wage law—the fact 
that both cases dealt with permanent mandatory minimum wage 
laws—and not the scope or relative intrusiveness of the wage law.  
The two justices simply came to different conclusions about the intru-
siveness of permanent wage standards, and Wirtz was overruled.123 
Missing from National League was a principled description of intru-
siveness.  Intrusiveness, itself an interesting proxy for a Tenth 
Amendment structural argument, is a matter of degree, and in 
Rehnquist’s judgment the FLSA was beyond the degree, while a tem-
porary wage freeze addressed in Fry was not.  Subjectivity is no 
stranger to Supreme Court jurisprudence, and it was being used here 
to attempt to put brakes on the Commerce Clause jurisprudence be-
gun in the second term of Franklin D. Roosevelt and by the post-1937 
Court.  Unable or unwilling to attack the real basis for Commerce 
Clause expansiveness, the effects doctrine, Rehnquist’s use and inter-
pretation of federalist principles is external to the Clause itself.  
Where the earlier cases were based on a jurisprudence of federal lim-
its coming directly from the language of the Commerce Clause, the 
cases coming after and during the Second New Deal established wide 
latitude for congressional action under the Clause.  In this attempt to 
break the momentum of the Second New Deal cases, Justice 
Rehnquist chose not to confront the holdings in those cases directly 
 
120 Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976). 
121 Maryland v. Wirtz, 393 U.S. 183, 193 (1968). 
122 Nat’l League, 426 U.S. at 849–50. 
123 Id. at 840. 
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by overrule (though implicit overrule may have been an option).  In-
stead, the opinion represents the beginning of the subjective ap-
proach to the Tenth Amendment purporting to describe what the 
Amendment says about the relation between federal and state author-
ity. 
Any other approach would require overruling the rationale of for-
ty years of jurisprudence based on the substantial effects doctrine.  
The result:  subjectivity as analysis in an opinion about federal intru-
siveness into state matters and the meaning of the Tenth Amend-
ment.  As Justice Brennan put it in his dissent: 
My Brethren thus have today manufactured an abstraction without 
substance, founded neither in the words of the Constitution nor on 
precedent.  An abstraction having such profoundly pernicious conse-
quences is not made less so by characterizing the 1974 amendments 
as legislation directed against the “States qua States.”  Of course, reg-
ulations that this Court can say are not regulations of “commerce” 
cannot stand, Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 466 
(1938), and, in this sense “[t]he Court has ample power to pre-
vent . . . ‘the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign political en-
tity.’”  Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968).124 
Brennan would refocus the debate on what is and is not “com-
merce” (and presumably what does and does not have a close and 
substantial effect on commerce) as a means of reining in the federal 
government’s use of the Commerce Power.  Yet, as his dissent sug-
gests, going beyond the boundaries of the Clause itself invites subjec-
tive assessment of the meaning and scope of the Tenth Amendment 
in pursuit of a single vision of federalism.  This is not how the earlier 
opinions of the Court addressed the federalism question. 
This is not to say that an unrestrained Commerce Clause is not a 
cause of concern.  Even for liberals like Justice Marshall, the author 
of the Fry opinion, there was concern over the Clause’s power to 
overwhelm state authority under the commercial power.125  Brennan’s 
answer to Marshall’s concern would be to find limits in the definition 
of “commerce” (internal to the Clause) and any external controls 
would be based on political restraints and not the subjectivity of judi-
cial decision making. 
B.  Alternative Federalism and the Political Process 
And at least with regard to political restraints, Brennan’s dissent 
became the law when the Court after nearly a decade of attempting 
 
124 Id. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
125 Fry, 421 U.S. at 547 n.7. 
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to define traditional government functions of a state overruled Na-
tional League in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.126  
The majority opinion authored by Justice Blackmun, whose concur-
rence in National League was the fifth vote in the case’s majority, la-
menting the inability of the Court in eight years to come up with a 
standard defining “traditional government functions,” proven to be 
the most difficult of the three-prong standard for determining feder-
al regulatory intrusiveness,127 that was not in some manner subjective, 
conceded the futility of the exercise and relegated the matters of fed-
eralism to the political sphere.  An undercurrent of reasoning would 
no doubt be the fact that the traditional government function test is a 
subjective test, the purpose of which is to achieve a result, protection 
of state sovereignty under the Constitution, which is in and of itself a 
subjective exercise: 
With rare exceptions . . . the Constitution does not carve out express 
elements of state sovereignty that Congress may not employ its dele-
gated powers to displace. . . . In short, we have no license to employ 
freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring con-
gressional authority under the Commerce Clause.128 
Justice Blackmun depicted the line of cases addressing state ex-
emption from federal taxes as a cautionary note in that line’s attempt 
to develop a limiting principle based upon a principled distinction 
between governmental and proprietary activities, the latter being tax-
able.  The Court’s decision to drop the distinction after a several dec-
ade unsuccessful attempt to develop consistency in the field129 was 
considered no less futile than the attempt to develop a standard for 
defining traditional government function, the regulation of which 
under National League would contravene the Tenth Amendment’s 
federalism principle.  The National League line, according to 
Blackmun, had produced throughout the Circuits irreconcilable out-
comes in trying to apply the traditional state functions test.130  The use 
of history to attempt to define traditional functions of states had 
proven inaccurate, unresponsive to the development of state gov-
ernment over time, forcing courts to determine, essentially by fiat, 
where to draw the National League line.131 
 
126 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985). 
127 Id. at 550. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 542–47. 
130 Id. at 538–39.  Justice Blackmun details the lower court’s confusion with lengthy citations 
to appellate and district court cases and alludes to the Court’s own difficulty in defining 
what is and is not a traditional state function. 
131 Id. at 544. 
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Lamenting the whole process, with the state/federal tax cases as 
evidence, as well as the apparent unworkability of the National League 
test, Justice Blackmun sought an alternative federalism principle.  In 
resorting to the political process, Blackmun stated: 
We doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled constitutional 
limitations on the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers over 
the States merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereign-
ty.132 
Justice Blackmun’s view of the congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause is a broad view around which states may determine 
their power, and not the other way around.  Federal power as defined 
does not give way to “predetermined notions” of sovereign state pow-
er,133 and the source for the state’s “residuary and inviolable sover-
eignty”134 is in the prescription for federal power within constitutional 
scheme.  Perhaps because of this scheme, which is the reason given in 
the opinion, or perhaps because of the unworkability short of fiat of 
the National League test, Justice Blackmun finds “safe harbor” in the 
political process to determine and enforce limits on Congress—a lim-
iting principle which he says is supported by constitutionally designed 
state checks and influence on federal power.135 
Passing federalism to the political process does not solve the sub-
jectivity problem but it does, as Blackmun reasoned, take judicial sub-
jectivity out of the mix, placing that decision with democratically 
elected representatives, an attempt to address the so-called dilemma 
of the “antidemocratic” features of judicial review at least for this is-
sue.136 
The two major dissents by Justices Powell and O’Connor raised 
the need for constraints on the Commerce Power and criticism of the 
relegation of the federalist meaning of the Tenth Amendment to the 
political sphere.137  However neither dissent addressed the central 
concern of Justice Blackmun—that to attempt to develop an objective 
 
132 Id. at 548. 
133 Id. at 550. 
134 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 285 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright 
ed., 1961)). 
135 Id. at 550–54. 
136 William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695–96 
(1976). 
137 In his dissent, Justice Powell stated, “We noted recently “[t]he hydraulic pressure inher-
ent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power . . . .”  INS 
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).  The Court offers no reason to think that this pres-
sure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the Commerce 
Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the States.  Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565 (Powell, 
J., dissenting) (internal footnote omitted). 
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test for traditional state function is a futile exercise—other than to 
acknowledge that the task was hard.138 
C.  Federalism Revival—The Commandeering Cases 
The traditional government function test was the first of three 
theories used to achieve the result of curtailing Congress’s post-1937 
commercial regulatory power.  Though a version of the test was able 
to re-establish itself in the line of cases beginning with New York v. 
United States139 and Printz v. United States140 as the “commandeering” 
theory, which was limited to disapproving congressional attempts to 
require state enforcement of federal policies,141 the next attempt at a 
general limitation on the Commerce power re-focused on limiting 
congressional authority in the private sphere via the regulation of 
economic activities. 
D.  United States v. Lopez142 
Congressional passage of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 
(“The Act”) without specific findings tying its Commerce Clause au-
thority to the specific problem it sought to address in the legislation 
essentially opened the door for the Court to place the first limits on 
the use of the commercial power in the private sector in more than a 
half century.143  The Act made it a federal crime for any individual to 
knowingly carry a gun within a school zone.  The basis for the legisla-
tion was the Commerce Clause though the Act did not include a ju-
risdictional statement limiting enforcement to possession of guns that 
had traveled in interstate commerce, and, more importantly, it did 
 
138 Justice O’Connor noted in dissent, “It has been difficult for this Court to craft bright lines 
defining the scope of the state autonomy protected by National League of Cities.  Such dif-
ficulty is to be expected whenever constitutional concerns as important as federalism and 
the effectiveness of the commerce power come into conflict.  Regardless of the difficulty, 
it is and will remain the duty of this Court to reconcile these concerns in the final in-
stance.  That the Court shuns the task today by appealing to the ‘essence of federalism’ 
can provide scant comfort to those who believe our federal system requires something 
more than a unitary, centralized government.”  Id. at 588–89 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
139 211 U.S. 31 (1908). 
140 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
141 Printz addressed a federal mandate to administer firearm background checks under the 
Brady Bill.  New York involved a  federal mandate that  states take title to hazardous wastes, 
and all of the liability associated with that waste, for failure to provide  disposal sites for 
the waste.  Both cases were seen by the Court as examples of extreme federal involvement 
in state affairs.  
142 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
143 Id. at 552. 
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not include finding that such possession would have a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce.144 
1.  Economic Activities 
Those infirmities were of no consequence to the Court’s decision 
in United States v. Lopez.  Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court 
focused attention on the nature of the regulated activity—gun posses-
sion—which the opinion accurately characterized as a non-economic 
activity.  Assuming, as the Court did without serious challenge, that 
gun possession, in the aggregate, would have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce as the government argued before the Court, this 
particular regulated activity stood out among activities regulated in 
the past by its non-economic nature.145  Each regulated activity ap-
proved by the Court since the New Deal revolution in Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence had involved an economic transaction.146  Mere 
gun possession, however substantial the effects on interstate com-
merce, did not fit into the company of past decisions and past con-
gressional Commerce Clause legislation that went before the Court.  
The holding was that the law went beyond Congress’s authority and 
was unconstitutional.147 
The Court relied upon the apparent need to maintain a balance 
between state and national authority.  However in pursuit of this fed-
eralist end to identify a limiting principle, the Court failed to lay 
down a principled theory to achieve that goal—the economic transac-
tions rationale for overturning the regulation had neither been a 
principle of Commerce Clause jurisprudence prior to the opinion to 
the point of inconsistency with those decisions according to Justice 
Souter,148 nor had any of the cases, as Justice Breyer pointed out in 
dissent,149 focused on the matter as a relevant fact.  The Court failed 
to establish a doctrinal connection between an activity’s status as eco-
nomic and the majority’s dual sovereignty thesis or the specific preci-
sion that places the federalist line at the point between economic and 
 
144 Id. at 562. 
145 Id. at 559–60. 
146 In his dissent Justice Breyer argued that the Wickard v. Filburn homegrown wheat scenario 
did not feature a commercial transaction inasmuch as the activity regulated was private 
use of an agricultural crop.  However, each private use could be described plausibly as 
economic by virtue of the fact that it diverted resort to the purchase of market supplies.  
Id. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
147 Id. at 551. 
148 Id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
149 Id. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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non-economic activities (while acknowledging the inherent impreci-
sion of the whole process).150  In addressing the issue in this manner, 
to find federalist balance, the Court departed from the deference to 
Congress that had been accorded for decades since the Jones and 
Laughlin Steel case in 1937.151  While acknowledging the past practice 
of the Court to review congressional assertions of Commerce Clause 
authority under the rational basis standard,152 the Court took a step in 
the other direction which amounted to a somewhat significant, 
though not complete overhaul of Court practice in reviewing Com-
merce Clause cases. 
The Court’s view with regard to an appropriate role for commer-
cial regulation was expressed in the Chief Justice’s counter to Justice 
Breyer’s dissent, which focused on the effects of gun possession on 
commerce and not the nature of the regulated activity.  According to 
the opinion, Justice Breyer was “unable to identify any activity that 
the States may regulate but Congress may not.”153  This seems to be 
the metric by which the majority would have the Court assess consti-
tutional theory from that case on—whether or not a theory leaves a 
space of exclusivity for state regulation.  As will be demonstrated, this 
standard is the doctrinal basis for the limiting principle on display in 
Commerce cases on through National Federation.154 
Quoting from Maryland v. Wirtz, Justice Souter pointed out in his 
dissent that “[t]here is no general doctrine implied in the Federal 
Constitution that the two governments, national and state, are each 
to exercise its powers so as not to interfere with the free and full ex-
ercise of the powers of the other.”155  The dual sovereignty debate 
notwithstanding, what is significant about the economic transactions 
rationale is that it was new in 1995 and unattached to any principle 
related to federalism and apparently based on nothing other than the 
fact that it worked to achieve a specific goal—to create the rhetorical 
space of state regulatory exclusivity.  The rationale was also the crea-
tion of the Court at this stage of the litigation, as the parties had not 
raised the issue before the Fifth Circuit whose opinion had focused 
on the lack of adequate legislative findings supporting the position 
that gun possession within a school zone affects interstate com-
 
150 See infra discussion at Part V.D.2. 
151 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
152 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995). 
153 Id. at 564. 
154 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
155 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 610 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 
195 (1968)). 
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merce.156  And even if one could make out a relation between eco-
nomic activities (as opposed to any activity) and the federalism prin-
ciple articulated in the majority opinion, the opinion failed to articu-
late a principled placement of the federalist line, mandated by 
federalism principles, between federal and state authority—i.e., the 
space of state regulatory exclusivity.  This was underscored by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s acknowledgement that “[t]hese are not precise 
formulations, and in the nature of things they cannot be.”157 
2.  The Meaning of Legal Uncertainty 
This imprecision is compounded by the fact the Court also 
acknowledged that any distinction between what is commercial and 
non-commercial will engender “legal uncertainty.”158  The net result 
of the opinion was to justify a non-deferential approach to congres-
sional action under the Commerce Clause where three areas of ex-
treme subjectivity (the selection of the criteria “economic transac-
tion,” the identification of what is an economic transaction, and the 
division of authority between state and national) will be decided by a 
nine-member judicial body.  It is at this point that the reasoning 
breaks down in a way that reveals the motive of the majority.  While it 
may be appropriate for members of the Court to desire some sort of 
rational structure that takes into consideration legitimate and gener-
ally agreed-on federalist concerns, what the majority is admittedly 
willing to sacrifice in that quest is more than slightly significant: 
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commer-
cial or non-commercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty.  
But so long as Congress’ authority is limited to those powers enumer-
ated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are 
interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congression-
al legislation under the Commerce Clause always will engender “legal 
uncertainty.”159 
Those outer limits have yet to be described in any way other than 
rhetorical.  The majority here can only promise legal uncertainty 
while suggesting an almost organic judicial role in sorting through 
the legal uncertainty.  This may be an inevitability in any system 
where judicial review of legislative and executive acts is accepted, but 
the judicial embrace of legal uncertainty is particularly surprising 
 
156 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993). 
157 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
158 Id. at 566. 
159 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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where philosophies are held deriding the use of judicial review to 
supplant legislative policy choices. 
This embrace is shared by the concurrence of Justices Kennedy 
and O’Connor.  While acknowledging the centrality of Congress’s 
discretion in such matters and that James Madison’s statement that 
“the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of 
their confidence where they may discover it to be most due” referred 
to the political branches,160 Kennedy joined the holding because “the 
absence of structural mechanisms to require those officials to under-
take this principled task, and the momentary political convenience 
often attendant upon their failure to do so, argue against a complete 
renunciation of the judicial role.”161  This broadside against Congress 
is without any apparent basis other than the fact that Congress came 
up with an idea about federalism different from the five in the major-
ity, but apparently satisfactory to four members of the Court.162  To 
Kennedy and the others making up the majority on the case the solu-
tion to an apparent lack of seriousness and deliberation by the politi-
cal branch is to replace it with subjective judgments of the judiciary: 
Of the various structural elements in this Constitution . . . only con-
cerning [federalism] does there seem to be much uncertainty re-
specting the existence, and the content, of standards that allow the 
Judiciary to play a significant role in maintaining the design contem-
plated by the Framers.163 
These rationalizations in both the opinion of the Court and the 
concurrence evidence a mistrust of Congress that Kennedy saw fit to 
articulate as an indelible character trait of legislative bodies.  And so 
it may be and certainly this distrust has been a core skepticism of the 
constitutional system since Marbury v. Madison.164  But federalism is 
not like other constitutional concepts.  As Kennedy acknowledges, it 
is an undefined dimension of the constitutional structure.165  And as 
then-Justice Rehnquist noted in an article in the Texas Law Review in 
1975, such general provisions allow for a more open interpretive lati-
tude than more definitive provisions of the Constitution.166  Though 
he was speaking in favor of applying a living constitution approach 
 
160 Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Whatever the judicial role it is axiomatic that Con-
gress does have substantial discretion and control over the federal balance.”) (quoting 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, 295 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).   
161 Id. at 578. 
162 The dissenting justices were:  Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens, and Breyer. 
163 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
164 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
165 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
166 Rehnquist, supra note 136, at 694. 
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only to those provisions amenable to such treatment, and not for a 
wholesale concession to the legislative branch, what can be more 
amenable to Rehnquist’s prescription than the structural principle of 
federalism, and maybe even the Tenth Amendment (which may or 
may not be a delivery device for federalism principles) which “states 
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered?”167 
E. Post-Lopez 
Immediately following (in legislative terms) the congressional gun 
law, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) 
which covered several issues addressing women’s safety and provided 
a federal right of action against perpetrators of violence against wom-
en.168  Congress may have been under the impression that the Su-
preme Court had not spoken clearly on the constitutional require-
ment of an economic activity as a condition to congressional assertion 
of authority, but Congress did establish what it regarded as the law’s 
commercial bona fides by providing extensive findings on the eco-
nomic impact of gender violence on the national economy, some-
thing it did not do when it passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act.169  
Perhaps hoping that the sheer weight of evidence that gender vio-
lence in the aggregate affected the economy might sway the court, or 
perhaps hoping that one or two of the Lopez majority might decide, 
due to the emotional nature of the subject, to abandon the economic 
activity rationale, Congress had passed legislation regulating an activi-
ty, violence against women, that featured even less of a claim as an 
economic activity than the possession of a gun purchased in the fire-
arms market.  In the case of United States v. Morrison170 the Court con-
firmed its reliance on the economic activity rationale—somewhat: 
[w]hile we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the ef-
fects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far 
in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regula-
tion of the intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in na-
ture.171 
Yet the Court majority rejected Congress’s attempt to get a recon-
sideration of the economic activity rationale.  To Justice Souter, the 
rationale simply supplanted the traditional Commerce Clause defer-
 
167 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
168 42 U.S.C. § 13931 (1994). 
169 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. 
170 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
171 Id. at 613. 
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ence via “rational basis scrutiny [of legislation] with a new criterion of 
review.”172 
Justice Souter states that the majority’s economic rationale has the 
effect of excluding particular subjects “on the basis of characteristics 
other than their commercial effects.”173  On this point Justice Souter 
emphasizes the degree of the departure, not necessarily simply from 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but from Necessary and Proper 
Clause jurisprudence, which authorizes the assertion of implicit pow-
ers to fulfill the mandate of the enumerated powers.174  The majority 
might answer this charge by reiterating the importance of federalism 
and the notions of dual sovereignty (notions which remain under-
defined) while the meaning (even if not its limitations) of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause are clear and applicable to the whole panoply 
of assertions of federal authority through legislation. 
That Lopez and Morrison dealt with an abstraction—the nature of 
the activity being regulated and not the definition of commerce or 
the fact that an activity, either singly or in the aggregate can affect in-
terstate commerce—was borne out in Gonzalez v. Raich,175 a case turn-
ing not on the commercial identity of the growth, possession, and use 
of medical marijuana under the California law making such use legal 
under state law.  A majority headed by Justice John Paul Stevens and 
consisting of the Court’s liberal wing (with a surprising cameo ap-
pearance on this side of the philosophical horizon by Justice Scalia), 
approved Congress’s regulation of the possession and use of marijua-
na, calling the activity “quintessentially economic,”176 inasmuch as 
homegrown marijuana could find its way on to the national illegal 
market, the rationale followed in Wickard.  While the conservative 
minority stressed in dissents the difference between a commercial 
wheat farmer and a medical user and grower of marijuana,177 the key 
rationale producing his vote which established the 5-4 majority was 
Justice Scalia’s articulation in concurrence, of a rationale (lightly ad-
dressed in the majority) for congressional commercial regulation.  To 
Justice Scalia, Congress could regulate non-commercial activities if 
 
172 Id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
173 Id. at 639. 
174 Id. at 637. 
175 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
176 Id. at 25. 
177 Id. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
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such regulation was necessary to a broader scheme of commercial 
regulation.178 
Justice Scalia, voting in the Lopez majority, argued that the opinion 
acknowledged that even the activity in that case could be regulated by 
Congress as “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic ac-
tivity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the 
intrastate activity were regulated.”179  Scalia, tracing the roots of this 
principle as far back as the Shreveport Rate Case180 and Jones & Laughlin 
Steel181 noted that the regulatory scheme would have to be dedicated 
toward an economic activity that presumably would be affecting inter-
state commerce.  As authority sourced from the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, it would, according to Scalia, be subject to the principled 
statements of limitation offered by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch 
v. Maryland182 (measures must be “appropriate and plainly adopted, 
not prohibited, and consistent with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution”).183  Justice Scalia, who joined, but did not write in support of 
either the Lopez and Morrison majorities, cited his opinion in Printz v. 
United States,184 and Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in New York v. 
United States185 as examples of how the Commerce Clause can be con-
trolled without destroying the “regulatory scheme” rationale.  It is 
important to note that the two cases were the commandeering cases 
discussed earlier where Congress sought to regulate commerce by re-
quiring supportive state action (regulation in New York, administrative 
tasks in Printz).186 
 
178 Id. at 37 (“Moreover, as the passage from Lopez quoted above suggests, Congress may reg-
ulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more gen-
eral regulation of interstate commerce.” (internal citation omitted)). 
179 Id. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
180 Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). 
181 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
182 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
183 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421–22 
(1819)). 
184 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
185 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
186 Justice Scalia can, and has spoken for himself in National Federation in addressing his view 
of the breadth of Congressional Commerce Clause authority.  See discussion of the joint 
dissent infra Part I.  However, in writing in support of the Raich majority’s decision in fa-
vor of broader, rather than the narrow Lopez/Morrison style of Congressional authority, 
the fact that he cited as an example of the Court’s federalist supervisory role over Con-
gress the New York and Printz cases is significant for analyzing Scalia’s position then, and 
what possibly could have been his position in National Federation.  The federal mandate to 
administer firearm background checks under the Brady Bill in Printz, and the mandate to 
the states to take title to hazardous wastes, and all of the liability associated with that 
waste, in exchange for providing disposal sites for the waste in New York were examples of 
extreme federal involvement in state affairs.  Whether those mandates crossed the consti-
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Scalia’s concurrence on this point, in response to criticism from 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent, might also have noted that the “regulato-
ry scheme” rationale has its own textual limitation—regulated activity 
would have to be “essential” to a larger regulatory scheme.  Though 
the invitation to parse out meaning in the term “essential” is but an-
other step in the parade of subjective concepts that characterize 
Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, it is a sub-
jectivism that can perhaps be reconciled with leaving the means of 
decision to Congress.  Because essential is a subjective term, Congress 
can decide, rationally, what it considers essential. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s “economic activities” standard, however, 
claims precision (which is acknowledged not to be quite so precise) 
of limits on congressional authority.187  The term describes a category 
of activities, and is limiting only to the extent that an activity does not 
fit within the category.  But that choice is itself purely subjective in a 
way that “essential” is not.  Requiring legislative regulation to be es-
sential to a larger regulatory scheme merely admonishes Congress to 
exercise discretion in keeping with the language of the Clause itself—
to pick only those activities that can be shown (presumably by quanti-
tative means) to be essential.  The choice to require that activities 
regulated be economic is far more subjective and hence more of an 
encroachment on congressional authority not authorized by the 
Clause.  It commands Congress to pick from a defined set of activi-
ties—those that are economic—and none other.  It’s a choice de-
fined not by a characteristic of the Clause but by an attempt to im-
pose limits based on a criteria not related to the Clause. 
VI. NON-ACTIVITIES AND CHARACTERIZATIONS AS A LIMITING PRINCIPLE 
For all of the complexity of the Individual Mandate portion of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the main issue before the 
Supreme Court is basic—does Congress have the authority to man-
date that individuals acquire insurance?  There really is not much 
more than that to what has been called the greatest challenge be-
 
tutional line is the subject of much discussion.  Nonetheless, dictating legislation (New 
York) and commandeering service personnel (Printz) is a far cry from regulating intrastate 
activities that may be essential to a larger regulatory scheme.  To many commentators and 
observers, that concurrence indicated that Justice Scalia might have been willing to open 
Congressional options as far as, yet not beyond, the extreme examples of Printz and New 
York.  This turned out not to be the case in the Affordable Care Act litigation. 
187 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). 
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tween Congress and the Court since the New Deal.188  This simplicity 
mirrors the simplicity of the constitutional cases before the Court in 
the 1930s—may Congress regulate wages in various sectors, may Con-
gress regulate production.  The answer to those questions was in the 
constitutional analysis and not in the details of the programs.  None-
theless a brief overview of the individual mandate is in order for con-
text. 
A.  The Individual Mandate 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is a complex bill 
covering a number of medical, economic, and policy issues.  As this 
Article is about the proper administration of the Commerce Clause in 
the federal courts and in Congress, an exhaustive description or anal-
ysis of the legislation will not be attempted here.  However, some 
background information on the Individual Mandate portion of the 
legislation will be useful for discussion. 
Among the many purposes behind the Act is to increase the acces-
sibility of health care to Americans.  The United States argued before 
the Court that the economic issue faced in the health care system is 
the problem of cost-shifting.189  Persons without insurance or without 
other government coverage such as Medicare or Medicaid will even-
tually need to consume health care and will be provided that care 
under state and federal laws, whether or not able to pay for that 
care.190  This cost is passed on to insurance policy holders in the form 
of higher rates, creating a “free-rider” problem for those that carry 
insurance.191 
Another problem in the present health care environment is the 
practice among insurance providers of not covering pre-existing con-
ditions.  This practice makes it nearly, if not absolutely impossible, for 
some in need of insurance to get coverage.192 
The Individual Mandate requires that all Americans purchase in-
surance if not already covered by some other government program.  
This requirement has the economic effect of subsidizing the uninsur-
 
188 Considering, as this Article has noted, that Congress applied a rational basis standard in 
reviewing Congressional legislation in Commerce Clause cases, no doubt the main engine 
for economic regulation in Congress’s powers, previous cases in which Congressional 
power has been stepped back beginning with Lopez were not the massive sort of legislative 
reform anticipated by the Affordable Care Act. 
189 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 6 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
192 Id. at 16. 
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able pre-existing condition market participants, and to eliminate the 
cost-shifting caused by Americans who otherwise would decline to 
purchase insurance.193 
The opinion of Chief Justice Roberts describes the individual 
mandate as requiring: 
[M]ost Americans to maintain “minimum essential” health insurance 
coverage.  The mandate does not apply to some individuals, such as pris-
oners and undocumented aliens.  Many individuals will receive the re-
quired coverage through their employer, or from a government program 
such as Medicaid or Medicare.  But for individuals who are not exempt 
and do not receive health insurance through a third party, the means of 
satisfying the requirement is to purchase insurance from a private com-
pany.   
 Beginning in 2014, those who do not comply with the mandate must 
make a “[s]hared responsibility payment” to the Federal Government.  
That payment, which the Act describes as a “penalty,” is calculated as a 
percentage of household income, subject to a floor based on a specified 
dollar amount and a ceiling based on the average annual premium the 
individual would have to pay for qualifying private health insurance.  In 
2016, for example, the penalty will be 2.5% of an individual’s household 
income, but no less than $695 and no more than the average yearly pre-
mium for insurance that covers 60% of the cost of ten specified services 
(e.g., prescription drugs and hospitalization).  The Act provides that the 
penalty will be paid to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) with an indi-
vidual’s taxes, and “shall be assessed and collected in the same manner” 
as tax penalties, such as the penalty for claiming too large an income tax 
refund.  The Act, however, bars the IRS from using several of its normal 
enforcement tools, such as criminal prosecutions and levies.  And some 
individuals who are subject to the mandate are nonetheless exempt from 
the penalty—for example, those with income below a certain threshold 
and members of Indian tribes.194 
B.  Characterizations as Constitutional Principle 
Constitutional outcomes must be obtained through constitutional-
ly principled means.  Legislation in an area not included in the Caro-
lene Products categories, rationally based on a clear congressional goal, 
would not be found unconstitutional because the judiciary believes 
that the degree of due process protection was less than what the Con-
stitution provides.  The rules in this area have long since been estab-
lished—the Court defers to Congress’s rational policy goals.  If there 
is a reason to heighten the scrutiny of congressional actions in the 
 
193 Id. at 17. 
194 Id. at 7–8 (internal citations omitted). 
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due process area, it would be a matter of Congress’s own legislative 
prerogative. 
The current trend in Commerce Clause jurisprudence is analo-
gous to the Due Process hypothetical.  The “economic activities” ra-
tionale stripped Congress of the rational basis scrutiny of its assertion 
of Commerce Clause authority, which it had enjoyed since 1937.  
Delving deeper in the process of authority stripping, this time the 
Court has denied Congress the deference of characterization.  Under 
the individual mandate, Congress requires health insurance, which 
most Americans will have to purchase.  Those that do not have health 
insurance must obtain insurance.  To Congress this is regulating an 
economic activity.195  To Chief Justice Roberts and the Joint Dissent-
ers, this amounts to regulating non-activity—something that Congress 
has never done before and, apparently, for that reason, cannot do.196  
No constitutional principle for recharacterizing the regulation of op-
tions in an economic market place is provided by the Court other 
than the position that it was “unable to identify any activity that the 
States may regulate but Congress may not”197 if Congress were free to 
regulate non-activity. 
To be sure, the Chief Justice and the Joint Dissenters may be cor-
rect in an absolute sense that the line to preserve the proper federal-
ist balance mandated by the Tenth Amendment, in spite or con-
sistent with Justice Stone’s “truism declaration”198 in Darby is at the 
point where Congress and the Court find themselves in this case.  Yet 
the Court has acknowledged the existence of a zone of uncertainty in 
this area of structural analysis.  This Article has taken the position 
that past arguments to rein in the New Deal Commerce Clause in 
previous opinions have not been quite so unassailable even if the 
economic activities argument was successful.  The question in Nation-
al Federation is whether the arguments finding Congress’s use of the 
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause are so over-
whelmingly without credible challenge that they transcend the zone 
of uncertainty attendant to federalism matters—and if not, is the Ju-
diciary the correct place to decide such matters? 
 
195 To Congress, the Individual Mandate “regulates activity that is commercial and economic 
in nature:  economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for, 
and when health insurance is purchased.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(2)(A) (2012). 
196 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2651 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting). 
197 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995). 
198 United States v. Darby,  312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
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In the present case, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledges that his-
torical uniqueness is not a basis for finding legislation unconstitu-
tional199 though it is appropriate to consider the “‘implications of the 
Government’s arguments.’”200 
1.  The Assumption:  Existence of a Commercial Activity 
The Chief Justice’s opinion notes that the “power to regulate 
commerce pre-supposes the existence of commercial activity to be 
regulated.”201  This observation is certainly plausible and probably fits 
with most intuitive understandings of the term regulate, especially 
when one is defining regulation of commerce.  However, the Court 
in the era of the Second New Deal certainly understood that liberaliz-
ing the interpretation of the Commerce Clause meant expanding 
Congress’s ability to regulate the economy.202  There may remain a zone 
of uncertainty as to whether that Court understood the pre-requisite 
for regulation was the existence of a specific commercial activity to be 
regulated (as opposed to an economic condition described above in 
the description of the Individual Mandate). 
2.  The Liberty Slippery Slope 
Chief Justice Roberts devotes a good deal of time pondering how 
far Congress could go in mandating individual behavior,203 referenc-
ing Madison’s expressed concerns about the potential of the “legisla-
tive department” to extend the “sphere of its activity, and drawing all 
power into its impetuous vortex.”204  While any one of several exam-
ples, ranging from mandating a balanced diet to purchasing automo-
biles as examples of the logical progression of the Government’s ar-
gument is cause for concern, it is important to understand this 
discussion within the context of federalism, the traditional area of 
structural concern within Commerce Clause discussions.  And no 
doubt the opinion addresses federalism as a “structural protection[] 
of liberty”205 when it discusses possible overstepping in the individual 
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liberties area.206  Yet, as a federalism argument, the Chief Justice’s po-
sition would logically lead to the conclusion that such a mandate 
would be appropriate at the state level absent a showing of a violation 
in the area of due process, which the parties have conceded would 
not be the case in the present matter.207 
If any of the examples of over-regulation of the individual were to 
occur within the states, certainly local electorates would address the 
matter politically, which several current and former Justices have sug-
gested as the preferable manner of dealing with Commerce 
Clause/federalism cases.208 
3. Future Effects 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion notes that congressional legislation 
predictive of future effects has been approved by the Court, but not 
legislation predictive of future activity, in this case the use of the 
health care system.209  The Government argued that health insurance 
is not like other products in the sense that it is not purchased for its 
own sake, but for the purpose of buying health care—health insur-
ance and health care are inherently integrated.210  The counter to 
that is that the two are different, involving different transactions en-
tered into at different times from different providers.211  The opinion 
states that “[t]he proximity and degree of connection between the 
mandate and the subsequent commercial activity is too lacking to jus-
tify an exception of the sort urged by the Government.”212 
The distinctions drawn by the Chief Justice and the Government’s 
inherent integration rationale are perhaps strong arguments for the 
political solution to federalism issues, at least in this case.  The cri-
tiques of the inherent integration rationale do not refute the basic 
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economic argument that health care in this country is financed 
through insurance.  Temporal differences, the fact that two different 
transactions (the purchase of health insurance and the purchase of 
health care) are two different transactions, and the fact that the two 
products come from different providers do not appear to be distinc-
tions of any particular constitutional significance.  And whatever 
weaknesses can be identified in this portion of the Government’s ar-
gument, the argument would appear to be sustainable under the 
standard that Congress may regulate matters that are an “integral 
part of a comprehensive scheme of economic regulation” which the 
opinion discusses in a separate section on the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
4. The Necessary and Proper Clause 
In his concurrence in Raich, Justice Scalia described the regulatory 
scheme rationale of the Necessary and Proper Clause/Commerce 
Clause power broadly.213  By his description, Congress could regulate 
intrastate activities, as well as non-economic activities.  This is particu-
larly important considering the Government’s position that the min-
imum coverage requirement is necessary to make effective the core 
reforms of the Act—pre-existing condition coverage.214  The circum-
stance in Raich making it attractive to the Government’s position is 
the fact that one of the parties challenging the Government was actu-
ally not engaging in interstate commerce, but was using homegrown 
marijuana, a practice allowed under the California law at issue 
there.215  The Chief Justice here in National Federation distinguishes 
this case from Raich in that the latter “did not involve the exercise of 
any ‘great substantive and independent power’ of the sort at issue 
here.  Instead, it concerned only the constitutionality of ‘individual 
applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme.’”216 
Conceivably regulating a national health care market would be 
constitutional under any interpretation of the Commerce Clause.  
The distinction between the “individual applications” in Raich and 
the present case is certainly one of degree, perhaps made less so if 
each of the fifty states adopted a medical marijuana law like Califor-
nia’s and in contravention of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) 
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at issue in that case.  Under that scenario, the CSA becomes far 
broader as it addresses far more than “individual applications.” 
The counterarguments offered do not stand for the proposition 
that the Chief Justice’s opinion is incorrect.  Yet these positions, as 
well as others offered in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by three 
other Justices do suggest an unsatisfying conclusion to litigation that 
has been anticipated for years as the final determination in a long pe-
riod of doctrinal development under the Commerce Clause. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has attempted to establish a principle that 
would limit congressional authority under the Commerce Clause 
since it was first put to use as a national regulator of commercial activ-
ity.  Initially the Court stuck close to the language of the Clause, but 
had to relinquish the tight rein on Congress as it became apparent 
that limited interpretations would not support economic reform 
needed during the Great Depression.  However, those earlier inter-
pretations were based closely on the text of the Constitution, perhaps 
more so than the next period of the Second New Deal, the longest 
period of doctrinal stability.  More recent decisions that have limited 
Congress’s authority have not done so necessarily by renouncing New 
Deal Commerce decisions, but by undermining the understanding 
between the Judiciary and Legislative branches on matters of the 
Commerce Clause and Federalism—Congress would self-police itself 
within the confines of rational basis standard and would only pass leg-
islation that had a rational relationship to interstate commerce. 
It was not a perfect solution to what may be an insoluble problem, 
but it did place the decision in the hands of the democratic branch.  
The alternative in the recent cases has purported to be definitive so-
lutions to federalism—perhaps the most indeterminate of the struc-
tural principles of the Constitution.  Instead the Court has provided 
standards that do not speak specifically to a principle derivable from 
the text, and what structural support that can be offered for the new 
standards do not support the kind of subjective decision making the 
newer cases have demonstrated. 
Even though the Court declined to overturn legislation passed by 
Congress on the basis of an alternative principle in the Taxing Power, 
and even though the kind of behavior, whether or not characterized 
as activity or non-activity or as economic or non-economic, the ulti-
mate result remains that the Court continued to place its judgment of 
proper federalist limits above that of Congress. 
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